Mirsepassi on Democracy in Iran, a Reflection

By


Haydar Ketabchi


In a recent interview with NYU professor Ali Mirsepassi, Columbia professor and host Hamid Dabashi asks a question that has preoccupied the minds of Iranian intellectuals over the past two centuries: whether Islamic societies can be democratized?  
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Professor Ali Mirsepassi begins by clarifying that democracy is not a “cultural” concept neither is culture an absolute or “irreversible notion.” Echoing the first chapter of his new book, Democracy in Modern Iran, Mirsepassi holds that the national desire for democratic values and institutions can be viewed apart from ones cultural needs and aspirations.  Hence, the relationship between democracy and Iranian culture is not mechanistic but historical and based on plural visions of society not tied down to one metanarrative of Iranian history.  To this end, Mirsepassi traces the rise of democratic institutions and processes such as parliamentary style government, constitutionalism, and rule of law to the Constitutional Revolution of early 20^th century Iran.

 In his view, the Constitutional Revolution, a movement supported by moderate religious intellectuals, does not represent a failed attempt to introduce democratic norms to Iranian society but rather a celebratory and historic beginning for future democratic movements. He points to the relative nature of democracy, disparaging the notion of an archetypal democratic system as a myth – that while some aspects of a given culture harmonize with abstract democratic processes, others may offend or produce tensions with democratic values. Despite cultural clashes with democracy under both the Shah and Islamic republic, Mirsepassi expresses hope in the continuation of democratic institutions and movements in Iran. The question remains, does the fact that religious moderates were involved in the Constitutional Revolution of Iran translate into supporting their presence in contemporary social movements for democracy? Isn't is fair to characterize the involvement of liberal clerics as contradictory and troubling? 

      Turning to the origins of secularism in Europe and responding to the question of whether separation of church and state can be achieved in Islamic societies such as Iran, Mirsepassi distinguishes between secularism as a governmental structure creating a legal barrier to religion with the broader ideology of secularism.  Returning to the Constitutional Revolution, Mirsepassi describes the process of secularization in Iran as one filled with angst and coercion. Secularization in Iran was held out by a handful of intellectuals as a
panacea to the social and cultural challenges of Iran in the 20^th century.  On the other hand, is it fair to dismiss the legal protections and social liberties of secularism because of the Shah's unimpressive Westernization projects which equated Europeanization with progress and development with modernization?

Mirsepassi stands firm behind his belief that Iranian people have always defended their cultural integrity and did not advocate for substituting Iranian cultural values with Western secularist traditions.  In the same vein, Professor Dabashi asks whether modernity manifests differently from society to society and whether we can speak of different stages of modernity. In response, Mirsepassi defends a multilayered concept modernity which is as unique as the social settings where democratic movement arise.  Iran’s current democratic movement reveals the pluralistic experience of democracy and social change according to Mirsepassi. However, the Green Movement is as much a site of sharp clashes and contradictory methods of fostering social change.  Underneath the sloganry of "Where is my Vote?" class antagonisms are are at work.  The idea of a homogeneous singular modernity that is appropriated and serves to substitute “authentic culture” violates the natural development of democratic norms suitable for a particular society.

Unlike modernization projects under the Shah where western values were coerced, Mirsepassi cites the Green Movement which arose during the highly contested Presidential elections of Iran in 2009 as an exemplary model for a type of modernity which is both authentic and reflects the organic tensions and desire for progress amid Iranian social life. Although Mirsepassi claims that western colonialism was ejected by the Islamic revolution and that independence was achieved as a primary political objective, he describes the determinative affect of self-image and perceptions of the West on Iran’s relationship to the world and to the rise of modern movements within Iran. For Mirsepassi, the Green Movement to this day continues to advance the primary goals of democracy within Iran and is rooted in a uniquely Iranian sense of civil rights, accountability and social progress. Therefore the political program of the Green Movement is neither dependent upon Western nations for validation or guidance nor are its values incarcerated in a Western narrative of change and progress.

Lastly Professor Dabashi asks whether Iranian intellectuals have overcome the ideological crisis shaped by conflicting perspectives of religious and secular movements within Iran. To this Mirsepassi promotes unconditional dialogue in society as the means to strengthen the democratic will of the Iranian people and to avoid becoming entrenched in the trivial ideological differences among secular, religious and other ideological bases. Therefore, public debate and dialogue with a common aim to pursue greater freedom of speech and press can help transcend what Mirsepassi characterizes as nitpicking among rigid ideologues whose battles are far removed from daily realities of Iranian public life.  

Are the conflicts among secular and religious intellectuals as superficial and hapless as Mirsepassi suggests? The history of Iran is a treacherous storyline of power struggles among often marginalized religious authorities, omnipotent Monarchs and revolutionary freethinkers. Mirsepassi believes that the everyday experiences of Iranian people have allowed them to transcend the customary divide between postmodern liberal Islamist and pro-western secular intellectuals in the form of the Green Movement. Until now these differences have prevented Iranian intellectuals from laying the foundation for a broad based democratic movement. On the other hand, has the Green Movement truly superseded the organic secular/religious struggle towards what Mirsepassi calls post-secular stage of thinking?

 In an earlier interview with professor Dabashi, Mirsepassi characterizes the current Green Movement as a “post-secular movement,” one that no longer frames its politics in the either/or framework of the past. Mirsepassi believes the Green Movement ultimately embraces both religious and non-religious or secular beliefs focusing less on their theoretical differences and more on finding a common ground of basic rights, human welfare and accountability. While the phenomenon of “religious experience” or even “religious thought” may find expression in the Green Movement through progressive clerics, outspoken reformists and the like – there is no denying that the Iranian people continue to disparage and vilify the religious authority and power of the Islamic state. Perhaps, the self-involvement of a few charismatic liberal Islamic intellectuals in the Green Movement does not translate into "unity with moderate establishment clerics" as easily as Mirsepassi may predict. To this end, he sidesteps the particular significance of secularism as an authentic way of life with deep roots in our culture and the broad anti-Islamic sentiment in Iranian society when playing up the novelty and inclusive ethos of the Green Movement.   

Intellectual trends among Iranians may not be as convergent as Mirsepassi claims and notions of a democratic life are likely to reflect opposing cultural values. On the governmental side, pragmatic reformists and hardliners quibble and and conspire over the fate of the Islamic regime and in doing so promote contradictory policies directing Iran’s engagement with the West, to the calculated promotion of social reforms and foreign policy of regional hegemon.  On the other hand, the anxious mind frame of the regime and dragging clique wars about the future find solace in uniformity of Islamic values and categorical allegiance to theocratic control as the way forward.

Can a politicized and rights-conscious Iranian public with a talent for political debate achieve victory over the state apparatuses of control created by a strong and coercive Islamic state?  Or, is Mirsepassi attributing too much to the Green Movement when idealizing their success and international popularity as a model for organic democracy in Iran? Although the Green Movement has found a strong social base among the Iranian youth and support from the intelligentsia and educated classes, their symbolic figure Mir-Hossein Mousavi is a reformist politician with firm roots in the Islamic regime. The upper echelon of the Green Movement seeks social change on the unstable presumption that if a liberal Islamist were elected, reforms and civil rights could be effectuated, some believe to the degree of ushering in a new era of sweeping social reforms.  Therefore, the leadership of the Green Movement defends the legitimacy of the Islamic republic while being critical of its functionality, accountability and procedural fairness.  

It is true that the Green Movement aims to cleanse the government of corruption, aggression, and fundamentalism. However, if we remove these dysfunctions from the history of the IRI, then we are left with something other than the Islamic republic aren’t we? Is it fair to present the Green Movement as a model for organic democracy or is it more deserving of critique than Mirsepassi permits in his analysis? There are tensions between the symbols and leadership of the Green Movement and the genuine egalitarian aims and fearless political activism of its supporters.

Therefore, the question remains whether Mirsepassi’s localized notion of democracy stands to challenge the authority of the Islamic state or rather provides an “everybody wins” model for how to negotiate social and civil rights within theocratic structures and respecting core Islamic values? If the latter is true and a mass democratic Green Movement must cave in to compromises with an unfriendly anti-democratic body such as the Islamic republic, can we hold it out as a model for democratic movements? If Islamic societies such as Iran can be democratized, will it be at the expense of important secular protections, freedoms and civil rights that are constitutive of democracy?

Another concern is the real potential for more defiant modes of protest which draw upon alternative political ideologies such as socialism, libertarianism or even American style democracy. Are Iranians to impose a moratorium on western ideas? Does authenticity preclude experimenting with secular,  philosophically Eurocentric or facially “unIslamic” approaches?  Mirsepassi’s notion of authentic identity while attempting to be non-foundationalist serves as a moral discourse that vilifies the West and regrounds itself in Islamist traditions.  One can’t help but walk away feeling that “our Islamic roots” or forgotten Islamic intellectual traditions were something good, and worthy of regeneration in society.  Some could argue that his local notion of Iranian democracy is guided by an affinity towards postmodern Islamist intellectuals, centrists, pragmatists and reformist politicians who do in practice what Mirsepassi attempts to draw out through non-foundationalist, existentialist, and cultural relativist approaches. One can agree with Mirsepassi that there is no fixed vision of democracy while opening up the floor to discussing authentic cultural narratives.  Of course, Iranian identity is an eclectic mix of East and West, ancient, modern and postmodern.  However, is the quest for a romanticized Shi'ite intellectual history the authentic or even desirable way to rethink identity, autonomy and public life in light of the horrors of the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Mirsepassi’s profound engagement with a uniquely Iranian democracy in the present state of affairs may lead him down the path of least resistance. A path where Islamic values and symbols maintain hegemonic authority over organic praxis and political discourses that would likely fall out of favor with religious intellectuals where they to threaten the IRI with sucess.  While Mirsepassi commends the inclusive character of the newly formed Green Movement and calls for a post-secular era of rethinking our political goals to address the concrete everydayness of Iranian society, we cannot overlook the serious and explosive clash of secular-democratic values and Islamic cultural hegemony in Iranian society.